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BRIEF OF DEFENDANT-RESPONDENT 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This is an action for divorce. The attorney for the 
Defendant-Respondent is redating the case due to the fact that the 
Brief of the Plian tiff -Appellant does not properly state some pertinent 
facts and includes other facts not pertinent to the appeal. At the outset 
it should be noted that the appeal is taken from a Decree of Divorce 
entered November 20, 1973 (TR-16) Not November 20,1974 as stated 
in Plaintiff-Appellants Brief. 
DISPOSITION OF THE LOWER COURT 
On November 20, 1973 (TR-16) the District Court of the Second 
Judicial District entered a Decree of Divorce in this matter dissolving 
the marriage of the parties, awarding Plaintiff-Appellant the custody of 
three minor children of the parties and awarding the Plaintiff-Appellant 
alimony and support money, equity on the home, certain securities and 
attorneys' fees. This Decree was entered upon Defendant's default in 
the matter based on the verbal agreement mentioned in the Trial 
Court's Order entered September 18, 1973 (TR-7) between 
Plaintiff-Appellant's attorney, and Defendant-Respondent, who, at this 
stage of the proceedings was not represented by counsel. 
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On February 21, 1974 (TR-20) upon motion of the 
Plaintiff-Appellant an Amendment to the Decree of Divorce was 
entered, modifying and amending the Decree of Divorce previously 
entered on November 20,1973 (TR-16). 
On March 13,1974 filed a further Affidavit (TR-63) amending the 
previous affidavit stating the verbal agreement and stipulation between 
the attorney for the Plaintiff-Appellant the initial proceedings and upon 
which the Decree of Divorce entered November 20, 1973 (TR-16) was 
based. 
On March 20, 1974, Orrin G. Hatch, the attorney for the 
Defendant-Respondent who had by this time become involved in the 
matter, filed an Affidavit of Defendant's Attorney (TR-26) to support 
his Motion (TR-28) to set aside the Decree of Divorce dated November 
20,1973 (TR-16) and amended February 21,1973 (TR-20). 
Thereupon, on March 20, 1974, the attorney for the 
Defendant-Respondent filed his Motion (TR-28) pursuant to Rule 60 
(b) (7) requesting the Trial Court to set aside the Decree of Divorce 
November 20, 1973 as amended February 21, 1974 (TR-20) to allow 
the Defendant-Respondent to answer the complaint, or in the 
alternative, to further amend the Decree of Divorce in order that it 
would conform to the terms previously agreed upon between the 
parties. Hearing on this Motion was set for April 2, 1974 (TR-31) and 
was set for trial by order of the Trial Court (TR-60), and after a 
number of intermediate and supplementary motions, memoranda, and 
affidavits were filed and settlemenental negotiations between the 
parties and their attorneys failed, the matter ultimately came on for 
hearing on August 8, 1974 (TR-73,77,80). 
On August 8, 1974 the matter was heard by the Trial Court with 
the parties and their attorneys present. Based upon stipulation of the 
parties as set forth in the Transcript of said Hearing (TR-80) and Order 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
3 
entered by this court dated August 8, 1974 (TR-73) an Order 
Amending Decree of Divorce (TR-77) previously entered (TR-16) and 
Amended (TR-20) was entered in the matter. It is from this Amended 
Decree that Plaintiff-Appellant Appeals. 
The attorney for the Defendant-Respondent does not think it 
necessary to further restate Disposition of the Lower Court Section of 
the Plaintiff-Appellant's Brief (page 1), however, we are constrained to 
write the Courts attention to the following error in that Section of the 
Brief: 
1. On page 2 of said Brief in the second paragraph it is stated, 
Thereafter, and on the 20th day of March 1974, at a time when the 
Decree had become absolute and final . . . ." The 
Defendant-Respondent contends, and will hereinafter prove that the 
said Decree had not become final at this time. 
2. On page 3 of the said Brief in the second Paragraph states in 
part, "on the 8th day of August, 1974, (TR-74) at which time the 
Court arbitrarily and with no reason at all reduced the award of 
attorneys' fees . . . " The Defendant-Respondent contends, and will 
herinafter prove that the stipulation made before the Trial Court 
(TR-80) was the free and voluntary act of the parties and their 
respective attorneys and was arrived at in open court and based on the 
testimony of both the parties and their attorneys (TR-80). 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The Defendant-Respondent finds no issue with the "STATEMENT 
OF FACTS" set forth in Plaintiff-Appellant's brief, except in the 
foil woing respects: 
1. On page 6 the second paragraph the Brief states, "Later on 
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April 29, 1974, long after the Decree had become final "As 
above stated, Defendant-Respondent contends that the Decree had not 
become final. 
2. On page 6 in the same paragraph the Brief states: "Neverthe 
less, and without any reason whatsoever except the statement that the 
Defendants business was slipping off, the Court reduced the 
amount....and modified the Decree " As above stated, the 
Defendant-Respondent contends that the reduction was stipulated to 
an open court by the parties and their attorneys. 
REBUTTAL 
POINT I. 
THE COURT DID INDEED HAVE JURISDICTION TO SET 
ASIDE AND AMEND THE DECREE SINCE IT DID NOT BECOME 
FINAL UNTIL JANUARY 21,1975. 
Rule 54 (a) of the Utah Code of Civic Procedure provides in part: 
"Judgement" as used in these rules includes a decree and any 
order from which an appeal lies. 
Rule 54 (b) of the code provides in Part: When more than one claim for 
relief is presented in an action, a final judgement may be entered 
on one or more but less than all of the claims only on an express 
determination of the court that there is no just reason for delay 
and on an express direction for the entry of judgement. In the 
absence of such determination and direction, any order or other 
form of decision, however designated, which adjudicates less than 
all the claims, shall not terminate the action as to any of the 
claims, and the order or other form of decision is subject to 
revision at any time before the entry of judgement adjudicating all 
the claims." 
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In the case at bar the complaint (TR-9) dated 20 August 1973 in 
paragraph 5 of the prayer thereof, the Plaintiff-Appellant asks the court 
to award one of the Defendant's automobiles free and clear of any 
incumbrances. Similarly, in the Findings of Fact and Conclusion of Law 
(TR-12) filed pursuant thereto at Paragraph 5 of the Conclusion of Law 
thereof it is stated: 
"That the Plaintiff is entitled to an award of one of the 
automobiles of the parties, the 1972 Pontiac Firebird . . . ." 
However, in the Decree of Divorce (TR-16) there is no award 
made of the 1972 Pontiac Firebird or any other automobile. Hence, on 
21 February 1974 an Amendment ot Decree of Divorce (TR-20) was 
entered amending the Decree of Divorce (TR-16) to; include the award 
to the Plaintiff-Appellant the aforesaid Pontiac automobile. 
Under Rules 54(a) and 54(b), because of the Amendment to the 
Decree, the Decree could not become final or subject to motion for 
ruling therefrom under Rule 60(b) until up to three months after the 
judgement was entered. Hence at this point in the proceedings, the 
parties would have been allowed until 21 May 1974 to move the court 
for such relief. Prior to the Statutory period, and in fact on 20 March 
1974, the Attorney of the Defendant-Respondent filed his Motion 
(TR-28) pursuant to Rule 60 (b)(7) for relief from the Decree of 
Divorce entered in the matter, and on 20 March 1974 the Trial Court 
issued an order (TR-47) requiring the Plaintiff-Appellant to show cause 
why the Decree of Divorce should not be modified as therein requested, 
said order based in part as stated in paragraph 7 thereof that; "7. The 
Divorce Decree was amended on the 21st day of February, 1974, and 
therefore the divorce is not yet f inal . . ." 
For the foregoing reasons, the Argument set forth on Pages 7 and 
8 Plaintiff-Appellant's Brief are moot and irrelevant, and since the 
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Decree of Divorce had not become final and was not a "final 
judgement" as argued, the Plaintiff-Appellant indeed does not and has 
not obtained any property right in the real and personal property 
involved. 
The Utah Supreme Court has defined "final judgement" in State v. 
Booth, 21 Utah 88 (57 P.533) holding: 
"Where rights of parties in action, a distinct and independent 
branch thereof, are determined by the court, and nothing is 
reserved for future determination except what may be necessary 
to judgements enforcement, judgement is final." 
Again in Fausett v. General Electric Contracts Corporation 100 
Utah 259 (112 P 2nd 149) which holds: 
"Final appealable judgement is judgement upon issues joined in 
pleadings; the judgement that determines the right in controversy 
between the parties litigant." 
And in North Point Consolidated Irrigation Co. v. Utah and Salt 
Lake Canal Co., 14 Utah 155, (46 P. 824) the Supreme Court hold: 
"Only jurisdiction that is conferred by Constitution (Art. VIII, 
Sec. 9) on Supreme Court is appeals from final judgements. 
And in Attorney General v. Pomeroy, 93 Utah 426, (73 P. 2nd 
1277) holds: 
"Final judgement is not a condition precedent to jurisdiction of 
Supreme Court, but is a condition precedent to review except in 
rare cases" and "Paramount policy of the law is to permit litigants 
to obtain review of rulings of trial courts, but there is also the rule 
that cases shall not be appealed piecemeal or in installments, and 
what constitutes final judgement will be determined by 
application of these two rules." 
Thus it is clear and unequivocal based on the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure the position taken by the Plaintiff-Appellant is not 
supported by the statutes or the case law of Utah, and therefore cannot 
be upheld by the Supreme Court in this case. 
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POINT II. 
THAT THE COURT INDEED AMENDED JURISDICTION TO 
ITS DECREE AS TO ANY AND ALL PROPERTY INVOLVED; AND, 
THEREFORE, NO INTEREST IN THE PROPERTY BECAME 
VESTED IN THE PLAINTIFF PRIOR TO THE ENTRY OF THE 
AMENDED DECREE OF DIVORCE OCTOBER 21,1974 (TR-77). 
Since the rebuttal of this point invloves the same argument as the 
Rebuttal to Point I, the argument is not restated here,but the court's 
attention is invited to the Argument and the Rebuttal of Point I as 
above set forth. 
POINT III. 
THE COURT AMENDED ITS DECREE OF NOVEMBER 20, 
1973 (TR-16) ONLY AFTER AN EXAMINATION OF ALL THE 
EVIDENCE SUBMITTED BY THE PARTIES IN THE MATTER AND 
A FULL HEARING AND TRIAL ON THE MERITS OF THE CASE 
AND PURSUANT TO THE STIPULATION OF THE PARTIES AND 
THEIR ATTORNEYS MADE IN OPEN COURT ON AUGUST 8,1973 
(TR-80). 
Rule 52 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure provides: 
"In all actions tried upon the facts without a jury or with an 
advisory jury, the court shall, unless the same are waived, find the 
facts specially and state separately its conclusions of law thereon 
and direct the entry of the appropriate judgement; and in granting 
or refusing interlocutory injunctions the court shall similarly set 
forth the findings of fact and conclusions of law which constitute 
the grounds of its action. Requests for findings are not necessary 
for purposes of review. The findings of a master, to the extent that 
the court adopts them, shall be considered as the findings of the 
court. Findings of fact and conclusions of law are unnecessary on 
decisions of motions under Rule 12 or 56 or any other motion 
except as provided in Rule 41(b)." 
All the requirements of this Rule were met by the trial court as 
indicated by the Order entered in the case dated 8 August, 1974 
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(TR-73) and the Order Amending Decree of Divorce entered in the 
matter on 2 1 , October, 1974, (TR-77). Since these Orders were entered 
only after a full hearing on the merits of the case and based upon a 
stipulation of the parties and their attorneys during this hearing as set 
forth in the Transcript (TR-80) the Plaintiff-Appellant cannot 
successfully argue that the court made its Order and Decree "arbitrarily 
and with no reason whatsoever." 
If the Amended Decree did not properly conform with the trial 
courts findings and the stipulation as aforesaid, then the 
Plaintiff-Appellant had his opportunity under Rule 52(b) to move for 
an Amendment of Decree. Even if the Amended Decree was improper 
in this respect as contended by the Plaintiff-Appellant, her attorney did 
not see fit to avail himself of the opportunity provided by Rule 52(b) 
to see an amendment of the Decree to make it conform to the 
stipulated Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law. 
Since he has not availed himself of the relief provided for in this 
Rule, he should certainly not be able to alter the courts decision 
through appeal. 
In the case of Dalton vs. Stout, 87 Utah 39 (48 P. 2nd 425) the 
Utah Supreme Court held: 
"Where no assignment of error was filed in Supreme Court, 
judgment of trial court was affirmed without review." 
Further, in Thompson vs. Hayes, 24 Utah 275 (67 P. 670) it was 
held: 
"All presumptions on appeal are in favor of trail court's 
judgment." 
And further: 
"Where there was no bill of exceptions or transcript of testimony, 
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findings of trial court were presumed to be supported by the 
evidence." 
Sorenson v. Korsgaard, 83 Utah 177 (27 P. 2nd 439). 
And again in Cullen vs. Harris, 27 Utah 4 (73 P. 1048) held: 
"Error committed by trial court in entering order denying motion 
to correct judgment could be reviewed on appeal from judgment 
only if properly preserved in record. 
Therefore, it is abundantly clear that where there is no effort to 
amend a judgment which on appeal is alleged not to conform to the 
Findings and Conclusions of the trial court, then the appeal is not 
available to amend them. 
POINT IV. 
THERE WAS INDEED CONSENT, AGREEMENT AND 
STIPULATION BETWEEN THE PARTIES AND THEIR ATTORNEYS 
WHEREBY THE COURT COULD FIND THAT THE 
PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT AGREED AND STIPULATED TO THE 
AMENDED DECREE ENTERED 21 OCTOBER 1974 (TR-77). 
This stipulation is set out very clearly in the trial court (TR-80) 
the Order of 8 August, 1974 (TR-73) and the Amended Decree of 
Divorce entered 8 August, 1974 (TR-77). 
Assuming that the Amended Decree was consistent with the 
Consent of the Plaintiff-Appellant, her attorney should have availed 
himself of the relief porvided by civil procedure 52(b) rather than by 
appeal as set forth in the Argument rebutting Point HI. above. 
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CONCLUSION 
Defendant-Respondent submits that the trial court had 
jurisdiction to amend the Decree of Divorce; and, therefore, no 
property became vested in the Plaintiff-Appellant until the Amended 
Decree of Divorce, dated August 8,1974 (TR-77) became final. 
The forgoing demonstrates that the appeal herein is frivolous and 
without legal basis and therefore we submit that the 
Defendant-Respondent is entitled to an Order of this court dismissing 
the appeal of the Plaintiff-Appellant and affirming the amended Decree 
of Divorce dated August 8,1973 (TR-77). 
Respectfully submitted, 
ORRING. HATCH, and 
ANDREW GREY NOKES 
Attorneys for Defendant-
Respondent. 
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